US-Ukraine Relations In The Post-Soviet Era by Rodriguez, Robert G. et al.
European Scientific Journal May 2016 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
383 
US-Ukraine Relations In The Post-Soviet Era 
 
 
 
Robert G. Rodriguez, PhD 
Sarah Hays 
Tyler Henderson 
Ricardo Garcia 
Ashley Cotton 
Texas A&M University-Commerce, USA 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 radically altered the world order. 
The Cold War was over, and the USSR became 15 independent states. This 
interdisciplinary research focuses on the political history of the bi-lateral 
relationship between the US and Ukraine in the post-Communist Era, 
primarily by analyzing executive-level interactions between both states. The 
purpose of this study is to explain how US-Ukrainian relations have evolved 
from Ukraine’s independence from the USSR to the present day in an effort 
to determine the future of US-Ukrainian relations in the short- and long-term 
future. This study includes an analysis of US government documents, official 
communications by the US, Ukrainian, and Russian governments, media 
reports from all three states, and the integration of numerous academic 
publications on the subject. Our central argument is that the policies pursued 
by the United States and Ukraine in this time frame reflect what International 
Relations scholars term “realism”.  In sum, all of the realism criteria are met 
in the case of US-Ukraine Relations. This leads us to conclude that as states, 
the US and Ukraine will continue to act in a rational self-interested manner, 
for their own self-preservation, without regard to the expressions of 
international organizations.  
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Introduction 
 The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 radically altered the world order. 
The Cold War was over, and the USSR became 15 independent states. The 
United States of America was then faced with reinventing its foreign policy 
in the region, and began the process of establishing formal political relations 
with each newly independent state of the former-USSR. Among these is 
Ukraine, a state that has undergone tremendous changes over the past 
twenty-five years.  
 This interdisciplinary research focuses on the political history of the 
bi-lateral relationship between the US and Ukraine in the post-Communist 
Era, primarily by analyzing executive-level interactions between both states. 
Therefore, the subject matter is neatly divided into the following eight 
historical periods of US-Ukraine Relations that mirror the executives elected 
to the presidency of each state:  
1. 1991-1992: Leonid Kravchuk & George H.W. Bush  
Relations between the US and Ukraine begin with Ukraine’s transition to 
democracy and the election of longtime Communist Party Leader Leonid 
Kravchuk as the newly independent state’s first democratically elected 
president. Then-US President George H.W. Bush assisted Ukraine’s 
transition with an eye toward dismantling the country’s nuclear arsenal. 
2. 1993-1994: Leonid Kravchuk & Bill Clinton  
Bill Clinton pressured Ukraine to become a non-nuclear state to sign a 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and establishing a Trilateral Statement between 
the US, Ukraine and Russia to guarantee Ukraine’s security. 
3. 1994-2000: Leonid Kuchma & Bill Clinton  
During Clinton’s second term in office, which coincided with Leonid 
Kuchma’s reign of power in Ukraine, the pursuit of NATO membership 
for Ukraine, the resolution between Ukraine and Russia over the 
stationing of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, the adoption of the 
Trilateral Statement and Budapest Memorandum that was to guarantee 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and funding to shut down the Chernobyl 
plant were all major themes. 
4. 2001-2004: Leonid Kuchma & George W. Bush  
By the time George W. Bush ascended to the US presidency, Kuchma’s 
scandalous involvement in the Heorhiy Gongadze murder and Ukrainian 
sales of military equipment to Iraq were beginning to unravel and had 
dire effects on US-Ukrainian relations. 
5. 2004-2008: Victor Yushchenko & George W. Bush  
The Orange Revolution popular movement that brought Victor 
Yushchenko to power, and George W. Bush’s reelection set the tone for a 
revival in US-Ukraine relations. 
6. 2009-2010: Victor Yushchenko & Barack Obama  
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The demise of the Orange Revolutionaries resulting in the ironic election 
of Victor Yanukovych, and the shift in US foreign policy objectives 
brought upon by the election of Barack Obama to the US presidency 
resulted in a new era for both Ukraine and the United States. 
7. 2010-2014: Viktor Yanukovych & Barack Obama  
Ultimately, Yanukovych’s rejection of the EU Association Agreement 
would bring US-Ukraine relations to the forefront of politics in both 
states. Unlike the Orange Revolution a decade before, the protest 
movement that came to be known as the Euromaidan would turn violent, 
serving as a catalyst  that would result in a dramatic series of events 
including Yanukovych’s self-exile to Russia, the Russian annexation of 
Crimea, revolts by pro-Russian forces in the Donbas; US economic and 
military assistance to Ukraine, the downing of a Malaysia Airlines by 
pro-Russian forces acting in Ukraine, and a series of US economic 
sanctions on Russia. 
8. 2014-Present: Petro Poroshenko & Barack Obama  
Eventually, the election of chocolate magnate Petro Poroshenko to the 
Ukrainian presidency, and the pursuit of the Minsk I & II ceasefires 
between Ukrainian and Pro-Russian forces would lead the US and 
Ukrainian foreign policies to become intertwined. 
The purpose of this study is to explain how US-Ukrainian relations 
have evolved from Ukraine’s independence from the USSR to the present 
day in an effort to determine the future of US-Ukrainian relations in the 
short- and long-term future. This study includes an analysis of US 
government documents, official communications by the US, Ukrainian, and 
Russian governments, media reports from all three states, and the integration 
of numerous academic publications on the subject. Our central argument is 
that the policies pursued by the United States and Ukraine in this time frame 
reflect what International Relations scholars term “realism”.   
 
US-Ukraine Relations 1991-1992: Leonid Kravchuk & George H.W. 
Bush 
 Following Ukraine’s independence, the US and in particular the 41st 
US President George H. W. Bush administration (1989-1993, referred to 
hereafter as Bush I to avoid confusion with his son and 43rd President George 
W. Bush), viewed Ukraine as a delicate area with a potential to ignite and 
disrupt relative peace in the region. Therefore, American authorities initially 
backed Russia as a regional power because they believed Russia’s central 
power could maintain democracy and peace in the region and had agreed to 
continue the track towards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) (Yekelchyk 2015, 69).  
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The Bush I administration initially preferred to deal with Russia and 
not so much Ukraine because it had a prior history of negotiation with the 
USSR (Kubicek 1999, 548). The 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act was initiated to 
secure and dismantle nuclear weapons in the former USSR. The 1991 act 
also provided funding and expertise for former Soviet states, including 
Ukraine to dismantle their nuclear weapons (Gak 2004, 106-135).  
 The Ukrainian Parliament declared its independence from the USSR 
on August 24, 1991, Leonid Kravchuk was elected as Ukraine’s first 
president as an independent nation, and on December 25 1991, the USSR 
was dissolved. A month later, the US approved a memorandum for the 
Secretary of Defense for humanitarian assistance to provide the former 
USSR, including Ukraine (US Government Publishing Office 1992a). On 
January 22, 1992, President Bush I stated, “As we begin a new year and 
chart our course for the rest of this decade, let us bring equal commitment to 
the challenge of helping to build and sustain democracy and economic 
freedom in the former USS.R., just as we did in winning the cold war. Let us 
help the people throughout the Independent States to make the leap from 
communism to democracy, from command economies to free markets, from 
authoritarianism to liberty. And then let us pull together to win the peace in 
this post-Cold-war era (US Government Publishing Office 1992b).” 
 The nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s inability to 
negotiate with its former partner Russia, meant the US would have to assist 
in negotiating an agreement between the three in order to reduce and disarm 
some of the nuclear weapons located in the former Soviet Union (Fink 1997, 
12). Roman Popadiuk became the first US ambassador to Ukraine on March 
27, 1992, and the first US embassy was established in the country (American 
Reference Library 2001, 1) Following Popadiuk’s installment, Bush sent a 
letter to congressional leaders stating “we have already seen an improvement 
in the willingness of these new governments to adhere to arms control 
obligations (US Government Publishing Office 1992c).  
 President Kravchuk then visited the US on May 6, 1992 and met with 
Bush I to sign agreements on economic and security issues. After the 
“successful meeting”, Bush I voiced his opinion on the outcome of the 
negotiations, “We welcome President Kravchuk’s assurance that Ukraine will 
remove all nuclear weapons from its territory and join the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state (US Government Publishing Office 
1992d).” Kravchuk said that about 50% of the nuclear tactical weapons had 
been withdrawn and the rest would be removed by July 1, 1992 (US 
Government Publishing Office 1992d). The meeting also included talks 
about economic assistance from the US to help rebuild and establish a new 
currency in Ukraine through a commodity credit of $110 million dollars to 
allow the sale of American commodities that could possibly strengthen the 
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free market system and expand trade with Ukraine (US Government 
Publishing Office 1992d). After the meeting, Bush I thanked Kravchuk for 
the agreements signed by both governments and changed Ukraine’s status to 
a most-favored nation, which was a long way from its status only two years 
prior, and hinted toward the establishment of future agreements. President 
George H. W. Bush expressed the US stand to support a “democratic” 
Ukraine, which sent a clear signal that Ukraine should remain on a road 
towards democracy or face losing US assistance.   
Ukrainian concerns over the heavily ethnic-Russian population 
regions in Ukraine became apparent soon after the USSR’s dissolution. 
Significantly, Kravchuk addressed his concerns over the issue of Ukrainian 
security during a joint press conference with Bush I by discussing political 
forces in Russia and their attempted territorial claims to parts of Ukraine. 
Kravchuk wanted some form of guarantee to ensure the national security of 
Ukraine, specifically from Russia. There was a question on whether Ukraine 
was afraid of losing the Crimea region to Russia. Kravchuk responded that 
the 1954 Act to transfer Crimea to the Republic of Ukraine from the USSR 
was “totally legitimate”, but that there are “some forces from the outside that 
stimulate and instigate separatist moods” (US Government Publishing Office 
1992d). Kravchuk provided the Russian vice-president Alexander Rutskoy’s 
statement that “Crimea is Russian” as an example and proclaimed his wish 
for peace in the region (US Government Publishing Office 1992d). The 
highly ethnic Russian populated Crimea region has been vastly contested by 
ethnic Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and Russians alike. In sum, while Bush 
I’s concerns dealt specifically with the NPT, President Kravchuk was more 
focused on the territorial and economic issues that revolved around the future 
security of an independent Ukraine. On July 2 1992, Bush I submitted a 
yearly report on NPT and thanked the presidents of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Belarus for their cooperation to fulfill the withdrawals of tactical 
nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Republics (US Government 
Publishing Office 1992e).  
 
US-Ukraine Relations 1993-1994: Leonid Kravchuk & Bill Clinton 
 William Jefferson Clinton (Bill Clinton) became president of the 
United States of America in January 1993 and served two terms until January 
2001. The Clinton administration believed that improving relations between 
the US and Ukraine was critical because if Ukraine returned to Russia it 
would also mean the return of Russia as an empire (Yekelchyk 2007, 195). In 
addition, Ukraine’s nuclear armament was a threat to the US and world peace 
in general. Therefore, the Clinton administration switched from the 
“pressure” tactic mostly used by the previous Bush I administration and 
focused more on making Ukraine a partner in the negotiations in order to 
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gain international security through the NPT. The strategy pursued early on by 
the Clinton Administration illustrates a change from the previous 
administration, and was more inclusive of Ukraine in its negotiations.  
 On January 8 1994, President Clinton sent a memorandum to the 
Secretary of Defense on the assistance to the states of the former Soviet 
Union (US Government Publishing Office 1994a). In the memorandum, 
President Clinton expressed the importance in assisting Ukraine and the 
region to improve security for the US and the world in general. President 
Clinton stated,  “The political and economic transformation of the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union into peaceful market-
oriented democracies will directly reduce the security threat to the 
United States and lead to substantial savings in the cost of the defense of the 
United States (US Government Publishing Office 1994a).” In a news 
conference held in Kyiv on January 12, 1994, President Clinton spoke about 
the willingness of all three presidents (Clinton, Kravchuk, and Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin) to sign the agreement that would commit Ukraine to 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal and how the agreement would increase 
Ukraine’s security as well as the entire world. Their meeting centered around 
the strategic importance of the Ukrainian territory, a US invitation for 
Ukraine to participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the 
enhancement and expansion of economic relations between both countries 
(US Government Publishing Office 1994b). President Clinton also 
announced an enterprise fund set up for the region to assist new small 
businesses and existing firms that sought to privatize and he expressed that 
US policy guarantees to assist Ukraine economically and in terms of security, 
depended on Ukraine’s pledge to follow through with its plan denuclearize. 
President Kravchuk recognized nuclear weapons as the most important 
problem facing the world during that time period and acknowledged the 
importance of economic support to Ukraine as well as his willingness to 
participate in NATO’s PFP (Clark and McGwire 2008, 1281-1287).  
 The process to make Ukraine a Non-Nuclear State would become 
closer following the signing of the Trilateral Statement between US, Russia, 
and Ukraine. On January 14, 1994, the Trilateral Statement was signed by all 
three leaders at a meeting in Moscow. After the signing ceremony, President 
Kravchuk said that Ukraine was also guaranteed compensation for the 
enriched uranium once the nuclear warheads had been dismantled as well as 
security assurances from both US and Russia (US Government Publishing 
Office 1994c).  
In March 1994, President Clinton informed Congress about his 
resolution to add Ukraine to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
which would allow Ukraine access to the US market by adding it to the list 
of developing countries (US Government Publishing Office 1994d). At a 
European Scientific Journal May 2016 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
389 
news conference to welcome President Kravchuk and his delegation at the 
White House, President Clinton expressed his contentedness with Ukraine’s 
signing of the TA, which allowed the removal of 1,800 nuclear warheads 
from Ukraine and also ratified START I (US Government Publishing Office 
1994d). President Clinton thanked and praised the Kravchuk administration 
and Ukrainians for their ability to move forward with democracy in Ukraine.  
Notably, President Clinton re-assured Ukraine of US support for the 
independence, economic stability and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Clinton 
also hinted at additional economic support from international financial 
institutions, Nunn-Lugar funds and G-7 nations that totaled to $700 million 
in assistance for the year 1994 (US Government Publishing Office 1994d).  
Clinton was asked about Russian imperialism and whether it threatened the 
stability of an independent Ukraine. President Clinton responded by pointing 
to the “Crimean issue” as an example that things could be worked out 
through Ukrainian/Russian policies (US Government Publishing Office 
1994d). However, President Clinton seemed more concerned for the 
immediate issue of the NPT and less attentive to any territorial disputes 
between Ukraine and Russia. When asked about additional US assistance, 
President Clinton reiterated the US willingness to assist Ukraine with $700 
million for denuclearization and economic assistance.  
In sum, President Leonid Kravchuk left a lasting image as a great 
compromiser for Ukraine because of his ability to accommodate both sides 
of the political spectrum. President Kravchuk led the way for the 
independence of Ukraine and followed through with policies that appeased 
both the US and Russia while at the same time assuring Ukraine’s place as a 
new democracy. During his administration, Kravchuk was able to negotiate 
Ukraine’s deal on NPT in exchange for economic and security assistance 
from the US. The US was more focused on the denuclearization of the region 
and most of the necessary steps to remove the nuclear weapons from Ukraine 
had been worked out.  Kravchuk succeeded in making the Ukrainian 
language the national standard for education and civil service that 
contributed to a sense of Ukrainian identity. However, the language issue, 
the use of the new blue and yellow Ukrainian flag and the new national 
anthem led to serious opposition in the heavily ethnic Russian areas of the 
east, which contributed to the division of Ukrainian society. This, along with 
blatant corruption, and economic collapse led to early presidential elections 
held in June and July 1994 when Kravchuk was defeated and succeeded by 
his Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma.  
 
US-Ukraine Relations 1994-2000: Leonid Kuchma & Bill Clinton 
During Kuchma’s first presidential term, Ukraine became the first 
country of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to sign a 
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cooperation agreement with NATO as part of the Partnership for Peace 
Program in 1995, and announced its desire to join the European Union in 
1996 (Yekelchyk 2015, 70). It was also at this time that there was a 
coincidence of interests that inflated US-Ukraine relations to what was then 
called a “strategic partnership” where Ukraine was described as the 
“keystone in the arch” of European security (Kuzio 2003b). It seemed that 
during Kuchma’s first term, Ukraine was on its way to becoming a 
successful functioning democracy and forging strategic partnerships with 
other democratic countries. US-Ukraine relations improved between 1994-
1996 because the US saw Kuchma as a reformer whose government program 
would obtain support from the IMF and World Bank; Ukraine’s reward for 
this was becoming the third-largest recipient of US aid (Kuzio 2003b). With 
the US by its side, it was hopeful that Ukraine in the 1990s could become a 
functioning democratic state and a future member of NATO.  
Five months after Leonid Kuchma was elected president of Ukraine, 
Kuchma met with US President Bill Clinton on November 22, 1994, to 
discuss economic and nuclear reform. During the November 1994 meeting, 
President Clinton assured President Kuchma that the United States would 
continue to work with Ukraine to dismantle its nuclear arsenal while 
providing foreign aid (Clinton & Kuchma 1994). Kuchma and Clinton 
signed the Charter of Ukrainian-American Partnership, Friendship, and 
Cooperation and the Agreement of Cooperation on Space Research for 
Peaceful Purposes. As for Ukraine’s interest in joining NATO during 
Kuchma’s presidency, Clinton encouraged it economically, politically, and 
in terms of security; and assured that he would not get in the way or do 
anything that would exclude the possibility of Ukrainian membership to 
NATO (Clinton & Kuchma 1994). The Ukrainian parliament voted 
overwhelmingly to make Ukraine a nuclear-free country and agreed to carry 
out two major arms control agreements on December 5, 1994.  
Ukraine’s parliament placed a few conditions on the treaty, known as 
the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, whereby the US, 
Russia, and the United Kingdom agreed they would respect Ukraine’s 
borders and never use nuclear weapons against it (Greenhouse 1994). The 
Budapest memorandum was reaffirmed in 2009 by the United States and the 
Russian Federation. Within the memorandum, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States express their commitment to respect 
the independence, sovereignty, and the existing borders of Ukraine. The US, 
Russia, and UK agreed to refrain from economic coercion designed to 
subordinate Ukraine’s sovereignty and also stated that the three countries 
would seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide 
assistance to Ukraine if Ukraine should become a victim of aggression or an 
object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Finally, 
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Russia, the US, and the UK agreed not to use any nuclear weapons against 
any non-nuclear weapon state of the NPT, except in the case of an attack on 
themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or 
their allies (Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances 1994).    
In February 1996, Freedom House honored Kuchma as the 43rd 
recipient of the Freedom Award for contributions to world peace, regional 
security, and inter-ethnic cooperation. The organization had strong ties to 
Ukraine in 1996 and chaperoned Kuchma’s trip to the US, where he met with 
President Clinton and spoke about Ukraine’s painful transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic system of government, and the 
importance of Ukraine’s new constitution that would help deepen the 
democratic development of Ukrainian society and legally provide safeguards 
against the threat of returning to authoritarian political control (Lew 1996).     
On May 31, 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Kuchma in 
Kyiv to sign a Friendship Treaty. Yeltsin specifically stated that within this 
treaty, Russia would respect and honor the territorial integrity of Ukraine, 
despite the urging of Russian leaders to try to claim the city of Sevastopol in 
the Crimea as Russian (Specter 1997). The main points of the treaty stress 
political and commercial cooperation between the two countries, and it 
includes a joint statement on the Black Sea Fleet that permitted Russia to 
operate on Ukrainian territory. The Agreement on Status and Conditions of 
Deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the Territory of Ukraine 
established the terms of the Russian Black Sea Fleet presence in Ukraine for 
20 years, and stipulated that its activity would be carried out in accordance 
with universally accepted norms of international law (Ukrainian Weekly 
1997). It also assured the people of Sevastopol that their social well-being 
would remain important to the leaders of both countries and that the city 
would not become a military annex of Russia (Specter 1997).  
That same year, the Congressional Ukrainian Caucus was founded in 
the US House of Representatives. The creation of the Caucus was announced 
to the public at a reception held at the Embassy of Ukraine in the US, 
commemorating the first anniversary of the adoption of the Ukrainian 
Constitution written under Kuchma. The Caucus is aimed at expanding 
bilateral Ukraine-US cooperation, including authoring legislation, 
disseminating information to members of Congress about current political, 
economic, social, and cultural events occurring in Ukraine, as well as 
drafting recommendations on the further development of US policy toward 
Ukraine (Embassy of Ukraine in the United States of America 2012). The 
main goal of the Caucus is to support Ukraine in democratization and 
market-oriented reforms, as well as to shape the US Congress official 
position regarding Ukraine’s success in their implementation.  
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President Kuchma narrowly won a second term as president in 1999 
thanks to his control of the media and his willingness to engage in political 
manipulation, including ballot stuffing (Yekelchyk 2015). The following 
year, President Bill Clinton visited Kyiv to advance and deepen the strategic 
partnership between the US and Ukraine. Clinton announced that President 
Kuchma would shut down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the US 
would pledge $78 million for the Chernobyl Shelter Fund to contain any 
radiation from the destroyed reactor, and another $2 million to expand efforts 
to improve safety at Ukraine’s other power plants (Clinton 2000). Clinton 
announced a 5-year, $25 million business development program to help 
small and medium-sized businesses in Ukraine to participate in the growing 
economy. It was also mentioned that because of Ukraine’s efforts to prevent 
missile proliferation, the US eliminated commercial space quotas to expand 
US cooperation with Ukraine’s space program (2000).  
 Ukraine’s record on human rights and democratization since the late 
1990s has been negatively assessed by many Western governments and think 
tanks (Kuzio 2003a, 23). This is due, in part, by a stream of allegations on 
the inner workings of the Kuchma regime known as “Kuchmagate” that were 
publicized in the Western media. On September 16, 2000, a journalist named 
Heorhiy Gongadze disappeared. Gongadze was known for speaking out 
openly against the government and used his popular radio show and website 
to expose the widespread corruption in Kuchma’s cabinet (Bailey 2013). 
Gongadze’s body was found decapitated and burned in November 2000. The 
questionable handling of the body and the autopsy reports created the 
impression that someone was trying to hide something, and suspicion 
focused on Kuchma’s government (D’Anieri 2007). Gongadze’s body was 
found the same month the tapes were released that contained a recording of 
Kuchma ordering his Interior Minister, Yuriy Krawchenko, to deal with 
Gongadze. Krawchenko is then heard on the tapes telling Kuchma that this 
was to be undertaken using his “White Eagles” special police unit (Kuzio 
2003a, 23). Due to this political scandal, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, based in the US, ranked President Kuchma in the top ten worst 
“enemies of press freedom” in 1999 and 2001 (Kuzio 2003a, 23). The 
Kuchmagate scandal was also one of the first scandals that led to a decline in 
the relationship between the US and Ukraine.  Beginning around the year 
2000, the US-Ukraine strategic partnership that had developed under 
President Clinton floundered and Ukraine’s relationship with the US fell to 
its lowest level by the end of Clinton’s presidency; Kuchma became isolated 
in the West (Kuzio 2003a, 26). 
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US-Ukraine Relations 2001-2004: Leonid Kuchma & George W. Bush 
On December 15, 2000, student protesters known as the Pora Youth 
Group gathered in Kyiv’s Independence Square and demanded 
accountability from their government, calling on Kuchma to step down from 
office (Bailey 2013). By February 2001, the opposition parties that ran in the 
1999 elections joined the protesters, and the European Union began an 
inquiry into the Gongadze murder case (Bailey 2013). The movement also 
gained support from the Ukrainian Socialist party, represented by Oleksandr 
Moroz, and a selection of other marginalized political groups in Ukraine. 
Protesters carried signs and created slogans to protest the corruption and 
oppression of their government, calling their movement “Ukraine Without 
Kuchma.” On March 9, 2001, the government ended the crisis by forcibly 
removing the protesters, arresting many of them, as the Berkut (special 
police forces) struck protesters with batons (Bailey 2013). These violent 
actions by the Kuchma government solidified the Ukrainian opposition 
around Victor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko.  
In the United States, George W. Bush (hereafter referred to as Bush II 
to avoid confusion with his father), assumed power on January 2001, and 
within two months of taking office wrote a letter to Kuchma assuring him of 
the important place Ukraine held in American foreign policy and the 
important role Ukraine had in building a stable and prosperous Europe (Bush 
2001). Nevertheless, Bush II refused to meet with Kuchma until the 
Gongadze scandal was resolved. After the September 11 terrorist attacks on 
the US, everything that was not directly related to the war on terror was 
downgraded in the list of US foreign policy priorities, and the entire post-
Soviet space found itself in that category (Dubovyk 2006, 2).  
By September 2002, US-Ukraine relations took an even sharper turn 
for the worse as an FBI probe showed Kuchma had authorized the sale of 
Kolchuga aerial surveillance systems to Iraq (Kuzio 2003a, 25).  In response 
to the military equipment sales, the US put a hold on a portion of its aid to 
Ukraine. US foreign assistance to Ukraine, which had been the third largest 
after Israel and Egypt in the 1990s, declined by nearly half from $229 
million in 2001 to $125 million in 2002 (Kuzio 2003a, 26).  After the Iraqi 
scandal became public, Kuchma was cold-shouldered by Western and NATO 
leaders at a November 2002 NATO summit (Kuzio 2003a, 25). US 
Congressman and co-chairman of the Ukrainian Caucus, Bob Schaffer, wrote 
a letter to Bush II urging him against meeting with Kuchma during the 
summit. 
Prior to Bush II attending the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, the 
letter stated that Kuchma clearly expressed his intention to violate United 
Nations sanctions imposed in Iraq by approving the sale of Kolchuga aerial 
surveillance systems (Brama 2002). Schaffer wrote that Kuchma’s behavior 
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was reckless and he directly threatened the lives of US soldiers and those of 
US allies. Schaffer also urged Bush II to isolate Kuchma and his associates 
while improving relations with other Ukrainian officials. Schaffer claimed 
that Ukraine is vital to the long-term security of the US and NATO allies, 
and it is in America’s interest to support the people of Ukraine in their quest 
for permanent independence.  
By 2003, Relations between the US and Ukraine were at their lowest 
level since the USSR disintegrated (Kuzio 2003a, 26). However, Kuchma 
sent Ukrainian troops to Iraq in September of 2003 as part of the 
international stabilization force to win the good graces of the US and Great 
Britain, and on June 5, 2003, the Ukrainian parliament approved to send 
1,800 peacekeeping troops to Iraq. (Zalizniak 2003). During the Iraq War, 
the Ukrainian newspaper Dzerkalo Tygnia published a poll that showed 90% 
of Ukrainians opposed military solution to the crisis and only 4.6% approved 
the war; while 38% of Ukrainians agreed that Saddam Hussein was 
dangerous for peace in the world, 57% said the same for George W. Bush 
(Zalizniak 2003).  
On September 11, 2004, Kuchma sent a letter to Bush II promising 
that Ukraine would remain true to its commitments as an active participant in 
the Anti-Terrorism Coalition and would do its best to counter terrorism 
(Ukrainian Weekly 2004). Clearly this letter was written to Bush II as a way 
to regain the US’s trust after the Kuchmagate and Kolchuga scandals. US-
Ukraine relations towards the end of Kuchma’s second term were in decline, 
to say the least, and many US officials were hesitant to trust Kuchma’s 
politics. The stage was now set for a de facto referendum on Kuchma’s ten 
years in office marred by crises and scandals, with the presidential election 
scheduled for October 31, 2004 (Kuzio 2005). 
 
US-Ukraine Relations 2004-2008: Victor Yushchenko & George W. 
Bush 
 The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was mired in controversy. 
Victor Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovych had received 39.22% and 
39.88% of the vote, respectively. Since neither gained the required 50% to 
win the election outright, a run-off election was scheduled to be held three 
weeks later. The election was serving as a benchmark for Ukrainian 
democracy- future relations with the United States and the West as a whole 
depended upon free and fair elections for the next Ukrainian president. The 
United States did not officially prefer either candidate, though Yushchenko 
was viewed as more friendly with the West. The US emphasis was on free 
and fair elections. 
 After the election, the Ukrainian Central Election Commission 
reported that Mr. Yanukovych had won the run-off, with 49.42 percent of the 
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vote in comparison to Mr. Yushchenko’s 46.7 percent, though most exit polls 
had shown former Minister of Finance Yushchenko having a significant lead 
over Prime Minister Yanukovych (108 S.R. 485). Nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO), Ukrainian observers, and representatives for foreign 
governments, among them US Senator Richard Lugar, an Indiana 
Republican, had witnessed brazen violations of Ukrainian campaign law and 
“international standards for democratic elections” (108 S.R. 485).  Less than 
a day after the election ended, before the winner had even officially been 
declared, tens of thousands of protesters had gathered at Independence 
Square (the Maidan) in Kyiv. Protests broke out across Ukraine, as more and 
more Ukrainians gathered at the Maidan. The United States government, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other 
international actors were quick to condemn the election, with the exception 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russian President 
Vladimir Putin allegedly congratulated Prime Minister Yanukovych on his 
win before the Central Election Commission (CEC) had even officially 
declared the results; the Bush administration filed a complaint with the 
Russian ambassador to the United States in response (Torbakov 2004). The 
Orange Revolution, as the protests were now being called, remained 
remarkably nonviolent, with neither the protestors nor Ukrainian government 
resorting to violent measures. 
 On 24 November, the Ukrainian Supreme Court barred the CEC from 
publishing the official election results, preventing Mr. Yanukovych’s 
inauguration as president until the court could review the allegations of voter 
fraud. Eventually, both candidates agreed on the need for another election. 
The Ukrainian Supreme Court ruled that the November 21 election was 
invalid and that a new runoff election would be scheduled for December 26 
(108 S.R. 487). The US Department of State was quick to respond to these 
developments and provided an additional three million dollars in funding for 
the 26 December election to “support election observers, exit polling, 
parallel vote tabulations, training of election commissioners, and voter 
education programs” in addition to the $13.8 million in election-related 
assistance that had already been provided in 2004 (US House 2004). Future 
policy, regardless of which candidate won, depended upon a free and fair 
election.  
 After the rampant fraud of the earlier elections, early reports of the 
December 26 run-off by observer organizations were promising. Overall, the 
electoral process had improved significantly over the past month with 
international observers reporting more balanced media coverage, the ending 
of editorial instructions for journalists by the government, and less abuse and 
misuse of state resources in pressuring voters. As in the prior elections, CIS 
observers differed from their Western counterparts in their analysis of the 
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election. The Russian reaction was a sole voice of dissent against the other 
observing organizations. Yushchenko announced his victory just hours after 
the polls closed, though his rival Yanukovych refused to concede the election 
until the CEC announced the official results on January 10. Though the 
United States commended Ukraine for a democratic election immediately 
after it had taken place, it reserved its congratulations for Yushchenko’s 
election until the official results were announced. On January 22, 2005, the 
evening before Yushchenko’s inauguration, Bush II personally telephoned 
Yushchenko to congratulate him on his victory and affirm the United States 
support of Ukraine.  
In early February 2005, Senators John McCain and Hilary Clinton, a 
Democrat from New York, led a delegation of 11 members of Congress to 
Kyiv and met with newly appointed Prime Minister Tymoshenko and other 
members of the Ukrainian government to discuss Ukraine’s dependency on 
Russian energy and the normalization of trade relations between the US and 
Ukraine (Nuzhinskaya 2005).  
In Ukraine, in contrast to the optimism of the United States, the 
reaction to the Orange Revolution and second run-off election was somewhat 
mixed. Less than six in ten Ukrainians believed that the December 26 
election was “completely or mostly fair;” that number rose to 87% for 
Yushchenko supporters and plummeted to 13% for Yanukovych supporters 
(IFES 2005a, 3). More importantly, the revolution had somewhat alienated 
Crimea and eastern Ukraine from the rest of the country. The differences 
reported between Yanukovych and Yushchenko supporters were magnified 
in these areas. Reflecting their ethnic makeup, they were far more likely to 
support strengthening relations with Russia in comparison to Ukrainians in 
other areas. This rift would continue to grow over the upcoming years. 
The next significant step in US-Ukraine relations was at the NATO 
Summit in Brussels in late February 2015. President Yushchenko was the 
only non-NATO head of state to attend, and he met with Bush II in person 
for the first time before the summit. President Bush stressed that “it’s up to 
President Yushchenko and his Government and the people of Ukraine to 
adapt the institutions of a democratic state… but we want to help them 
achieve that work” (US Government Publishing Office 2005a). To that end, 
he announced additional funding from the United States towards NATO’s 
newly created small arms disarmament program for Ukraine (US 
Government Publishing Office 2005a). Separately, a few weeks later the 
House authorized an additional $33.7 million in assistance for Ukraine in an 
emergency appropriations act (Cong. Rec. 2005, 151, pt. 31, H1471), 
although this amount was nearly doubled after President Yushchenko’s visit 
to the United States in April 2005.  
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At the summit President Yushchenko announced, “Ukraine has made 
its position clear about joining the Membership Action Plan” (NATO 2005). 
Shortly after the summit, however, the government of Ukraine announced 
that it was withdrawing all Ukrainian troops from the NATO mission in Iraq 
by the end of the year. In response, Senator Lugar stated that this withdrawal 
“was not a plus factor” in Ukraine’s relationship with the United States but 
the Yushchenko administration was handling the situation “tactfully” and he 
remained enthusiastic about the prospects of economic reform in Ukraine 
(Bihun 2005). 
President Yushchenko’s visit to the United States in April 2005 was a 
marker of the growing relationship between Ukraine and the US. Together, 
Yushchenko and Bush II reiterated Ukraine’s intention to “move closer to, 
and ultimately join European, Euro-Atlantic and international institutions” 
with full US support (US Government Publishing Office 2005b). The press 
release announced the two presidents’ support of permanent normal trade 
relation status between the two nations, mirroring bills that had already been 
introduced in Congress (US Government Publishing Office 2005b). They 
announced the creation of a dialogue about Ukraine’s energy sector between 
the energy departments of each nation for the “restructuring and reform of 
Ukraine’s energy sector,” which was dependent on Russian natural gas (US 
Government Publishing Office 2005b). In addition to a general expansion of 
healthcare-related assistance for Ukraine, the United States provided an 
additional $45 million towards the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan, 
though it was noted that in the future “US assistance to Ukraine will 
particularly focus on solidifying democratic advances through anti-
corruption and rule-of-law programs… and other steps to improve electoral 
institutions and practices” (US Government Publishing Office 2005b). Last, 
to facilitate contact between Ukraine and the United States, visa 
requirements in Ukraine for Americans were eliminated while the United 
States reduced visa fees for Ukrainians. President Yushchenko addressed a 
Joint Session of Congress during his visit. He stressed the reforms that 
Ukraine had been undertaking for the past several months, noted the 
increased independence of the media and the government’s commitment to 
judicial reform, and assured that the parliamentary elections scheduled for 
March 2006 would be free and fair. He reiterated his government’s intentions 
to strengthen ties with the West, with a “vision of the future [with] Ukraine 
in a united Europe” and that “Ukraine wishes to guarantee security to its 
citizens… it is only logical that we target our efforts towards the integration 
to NATO” (Cong. Rec. 2005, 151, pt. 38, H1785). The goal of Yushchenko’s 
visit to the United States was to “establish a new era in Ukraine-US 
relations… a new Ukraine offers the US a genuinely strategic partnership” 
(Cong. Rec. 2005, 151, pt. 38, H1785). Overall, President Yushchenko’s visit 
European Scientific Journal May 2016 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
398 
marked the beginning of a major step forward in Ukraine-US relations that 
continued to manifest through the rest of 2005. 
 In early May 2005, at the administration’s request, Congress 
increased the emergency appropriations allocated to Ukraine in March from 
$33.7 million to $60 million in aid earmarked for the “government of 
Ukraine’s highest priorities for political and economic reform, including 
anti-corruption initiatives and support for the upcoming parliamentary 
elections” (Cong. Rec. 151, pt. 38, H3007). In June, US Senator Chuck 
Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska, led a high level delegation to Kyiv to 
meet with senior Ukrainian officials where they discussed “strengthening 
bilateral ties in defense and economic affairs” and he “congratulated the new 
Ukrainian government on its commitment to adopting market-oriented 
economic reforms that will promote a healthy business climate and ensure 
long-term prosperity” (Embassy of the United States to Ukraine 2005). 
 In late August, Senator Lugar, escorted by freshman Senator Barack 
Obama, a Democrat from Illinois, travelled to Kyiv to discuss an expansion 
of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act, which had established the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program to fund the elimination of weapons in the former Soviet 
Union. The new agreement brokered by Senators Lugar and Obama included 
initiatives to expand biological threat capabilities in Ukraine by funding the 
creation of “epidemiological laboratories that store biological pathogens and 
[to] establish a national network of epidemiological monitoring stations” that 
could effectively combat outbreaks of infectious disease “whether naturally 
occurring or as a result of bioterrorism” (Sedova 2005). The senators also 
discussed economic relations with the Ukrainian government. On August 31, 
the Office of the US Trade Representative announced that it would be ending 
a $75 million sanction on Ukrainian imports to the United States in response 
to the Rada passing laws that improved intellectual property rights in 
Ukraine, further easing access to the WTO (US Trade Representative 2005).  
In December 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke to 
students at Taras Shevchenko University in Lviv. Secretary Rice praised the 
political and economic reforms that had occurred over the past year, and told 
the students that “the United States now imagines a Ukraine that serves as an 
anchor of democratic stability in Europe and Eurasia. The United States will 
help Ukraine to implement the necessary political and economic reforms to 
achieve the goal of membership in the European Union and the World Trade 
Organization” (US Department of State 2005).  
While the prospect of strengthening US-Ukraine relations and 
Ukrainian efforts toward democratic and economic reform remained positive 
in the United States throughout 2005, it was not matched by a similar 
enthusiasm in Ukraine. Less than four in ten respondents believed the March 
2006 parliamentary elections would be somewhat or completely free and fair 
European Scientific Journal May 2016 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
399 
and support for President Yushchenko, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the 
Rada had all plummeted by around 20% in only nine months (IFES 2005b, 
3). The Party of Regions, the bloc of former Prime Minister Yanukovych 
was already taking a significant lead over the fractured Orange coalition 
parties by the time of the survey as well, with just under one in five 
respondents answering that they would vote for the Party of Regions if the 
election was held on the upcoming Sunday, foreshadowing the results four 
years later (IFES 2005b, 21). 
 Early in 2006, the primary focus of US-Ukraine relations was on 
closer economic ties between the two nations and further improvement of 
Ukraine’s economic situation. The Generalized System of Preferences 
benefits for Ukraine was reinstated and Congress passed legislation 
normalizing trade relations with Ukraine. Bush II signed the bill into law on 
March 23, remarking that it was “the beginning of a new era in our history… 
The cold war is over, and a free Ukraine is a friend to America and an 
inspiration to those who love liberty,” and “our nations’ friendship will 
grow” as a result of increased trade (US Government Publishing Office 
2006). Ultimately, however, these growing economic ties in early 2006 were 
somewhat offset by the results of the March 26 election that propelled 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions back into a prominent position in the Rada, 
leading to a cooling of relations between the United States and Ukraine. The 
OSCE chose Representative Alcee Hastings, a Democrat from Florida to 
serve as the special coordinator for the OSCE observers present during the 
March 26 elections, which the organization found to be free and fair 
(Ukrainian Weekly 2006a). 
 A month later, speaking in Bulgaria, Secretary of State Rice 
commented that “The Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people will 
have to decide whether or not [joining NATO] is something that they wish to 
pursue,” referring to the Party of Regions opposition to Ukraine’s 
membership in NATO (Embassy of the United States 2006). In early June, 
Bush II’s planned trip to Kyiv was “postponed,” “due to the lack of a 
government in Ukraine” after coalition talks between the former Orange 
parties had still not resulted in an agreement (Ukrainian Weekly 2006b).  
 Relations between the United States and Ukraine continued to 
deteriorate in 2007. During a speech at the Embassy of Ukraine, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Arseniy Yatsenyuk summarized the political infighting in 
Ukraine as “domestic problems… what is going on right now is part of a 
normal political process” (Bihun 2007). Minister Yatsenyuk extended thanks 
to the United States for staying out of the affair and added, “Ukrainian 
political problems should be resolved by Ukrainian politicians and not by the 
US Congress or government” (Bihun 2007). The Bush administration 
maintained its distance through 2007. Early in September, USAID 
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announced that it was cutting all funding to the US-Ukraine Foundation 
(USUF), a NGO that the editors of the Ukrainian Weekly claimed had “an 
excellent track record—one that may be second to none in helping Ukraine 
by working with what the foundation likes to call its ‘democratic 
modernizers’” (Ukrainian Weekly 2007).  That same month, Tymoshenko 
replaced Yanukovych as Prime Minister after parliamentary elections, 
leading to warmer relations between the Bush administration and Ukraine 
began in 2008. The focus during this time was on Ukraine’s eventual joining 
of NATO. Relations with Ukraine were viewed as part of US relations with 
Russia. The renewed support for Ukraine joining NATO was partially in 
response to Russian threats against Ukraine earlier in the year (US Senate 
2008, 4). In testimony before the US Senate, James Townsend, Jr. of the 
Atlantic Council stated, “Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic 
center of gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian membership in NATO raises, 
for Russians, not just misplaced fears of NATO encroachment on its borders, 
but a shrinking of what Russian strategists see as their sphere of influence. 
But, Russian pressure should have no control over the decisions that a 
sovereign nation like Ukraine should make about what institutions it wants to 
affiliate with” (US Senate 2008, 69).  Notably, then-Senator Obama asserted 
that “Russia cannot have a veto over which countries join the alliance” (US 
Senate 2008, 86). Overall, the hearing concluded that a MAP for Ukraine 
was necessary not only in recognition of the reforms over the previous years, 
but also simply in an attempt to curb Russian influence in the region.  
 In a show of public support, President George W. Bush made his first 
official state visit to Kyiv on March 31-April 1, 2008, on his way to NATO’s 
Bucharest summit. President Bush praised Ukraine’s actions continuing 
cooperation with NATO, noting that “Ukraine is the only non-NATO nation 
supporting every NATO mission,” and pledged the full support of the United 
States in persuading NATO to grant MAP status (US Government 
Publishing Office 2008). Ukraine was not extended a MAP at the summit. At 
the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin allegedly snapped at President 
Bush, stating “Do you understand, George [W. Bush], that Ukraine is not 
even a state” (Burne, Rachkevych, and Marson 2010).  
 The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 in support of 
separatist movements cast serious doubts on the ability of the West to 
guarantee Ukrainian territorial integrity. President Yushchenko visited 
Washington in September and met with Bush II, but their joint statement 
carefully avoided any mention of the crisis in Georgia. On December 19, 
2008, Secretary of State Rice and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr 
Ohryzko signed the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. While it 
was an affirmation of the renewed relations between the two nations during 
2008, it was also a last attempt by the Bush II administration to curb Russian 
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aggression in the region without the support of NATO. The first section of 
the charter is concerned with maintaining Ukrainian territorial integrity, with 
principle 1 stating “Support for each other’s sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders constitutes the foundation of 
our bilateral relations” (US Department of State 2008). 
 
US-Ukraine Relations 2009-2010: Victor Yushchenko and Barack 
Obama  
 The government of Ukraine was unsure where it stood in relation to 
the United States after President Barack Obama took office in January 2009. 
Both President Obama and Vice President Biden had been friendly with 
Ukraine during their tenure as US Senators. While the Obama administration 
would continue to oppose Russia’s zero-sum view of foreign relations, Vice 
President Biden stressed that “the last few years have seen a dangerous drift 
in relations between Russia and [NATO]… it’s time to press the reset button 
and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together 
with Russia” (The White House 2009a). To reassure Ukraine that this did not 
mean a similar reset for relations between the United States and Ukraine, 
Vice President Biden visited Kyiv in July 2009. However, Vice President 
Biden was careful to never state that the United States supports Ukraine 
joining NATO or being granted a MAP. Instead, he only brought up US 
support for “deepening ties” between NATO and Ukraine (Office of the Vice 
President 2009b). For the rest of the year, relations with Ukraine focused on 
economics rather than security. In December, following a visit to 
Washington by Foreign Affairs Minister Petro Poroshenko, the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) restored its programs in Ukraine, 
stimulating investment by US companies (Embassy of the United States 
2009). 
 The lead-up to the January 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine 
witnessed more in-fighting between former Orange allies Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko, while Victor Yanukovych secured an early lead in the polls. 
By November 2009 he was the most popular candidate, with 31.2% of 
respondents saying they would vote for him, followed by 19.1% of 
Ukrainians supporting Tymoshenko (IFES 2009). President Yushchenko was 
by far the least popular of the major candidates with only 14% of Ukrainians 
having a positive opinion of him and less than 4% of Ukrainians claiming 
that they would vote for him in the upcoming election (IFES 2009).   
None of the candidates received the required majority needed to win 
outright, but in a February 7 2010 run-off, Yanukovych defeated 
Tymoshenko by a margin of 3.5% (Zawada 2010). Thus, a grand irony 
emerged in Ukrainian politics when the people elected the candidate accused 
of rigging the 2004 election which sparked the Orange Revolution. To 
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further the ironic twist, President Obama congratulated Yanukovych three 
days before the official tally was announced, while Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev cautiously only congratulated Yanukovych for his “election 
campaign, which received a high evaluation from international observers,” 
(The White House 2010a and Zawada 2010).  
 
US-Ukraine Relations 2010-2014: Viktor Yanukovych and Barack 
Obama  
 Upon assuming the presidency, Yanukovych  assured various 
European partners that accession to the European Union was one of 
Ukraine’s top aims, noting “European Union membership remains Ukraine’s 
strategic goal” (Alexe 2010). Despite Yanukovych’s promises for a healthy 
balance between the West and Ukraine’s neighbor to the east, his 
administration pulled Ukraine closer to Russia reversing various diplomatic 
cleavages created by Yanukovych’s predecessor, Yushchenko. 
In April 2010, US President Barack Obama and Yanukovych released 
a joint statement reaffirming the partnership between the United States and 
Ukraine, vowing to uphold and build upon the United States-Ukraine Charter 
on Strategic Partnership the two countries signed in December 2008. The 
statement was another hopeful gesture by Western actors who wished to 
encourage the new administration to lean further Westward and away from 
its historic ties with Russia (The White House 2010b). Ukraine under 
Yanukovych nearly fell into bankruptcy as oligarchs looted the country’s 
coffers and deepened decades of corruption Ukraine had yet to completely 
eradicate.  
Though Yanukovych faced scrutiny by various international actors 
and Ukrainian citizens alike, the turning point in his increasingly unpopular 
administration came in November 2013 when he declined to sign the 
country’s much anticipated EU Association Agreement, an agreement that 
took more than two decades to secure. Described as a “miracle [that] did not 
happen” (Euronews 2013), Yanukovych’s government suddenly backed out 
of the agreement, retreating from the country’s long journey to gain closer 
ties to the West, instead opting to renew relations with Russia. Immediately 
following the decision, the US Department of State expressed its 
disappointment, but affirmed that the US “stand[s] with the vast majority of 
Ukrainians who want to see this future for their country” (US Department Of 
State 2013a).  
In the immediate aftermath of Yanukovych bowing to Russian 
pressure, tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens took to the country’s capital 
to protest the decision on November 21, 2013. The subsequent protests 
became known as the Euromaidan as demonstrators held continuous public 
protests in Kyiv’s main Maidan Nezalezhnosti or “Independence Square,” 
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the same site of the country’s infamous Orange Revolution in 2004. For the 
second time in less than a decade, the actions of Viktor Yanukovych 
motivated thousands to descend upon the square in protest. The initial 
protests remained peaceful, with few exceptions of vandalism and outbursts 
of skirmishes between protestors and the Berkut, Ukraine's special police 
force employed by the government's Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
Peaceful demonstrations turned violent on November 30 as police 
attacked Maidan protestors in an attempt to disperse them from the square, 
injuring dozens of people which triggered hundreds of thousands of 
protestors – roughly 700,000 according to Ukrainian media (Hanenkrat 
2013) – to march toward the Maidan on December 1. Over the next few 
days, protestors created makeshift camps in the Maidan, complete with tents, 
barricades and campfires and masses gathered in downtown Kyiv in ways 
somewhat reminiscent of the Orange Revolution. Despite relatively peaceful 
demonstrations in downtown Kyiv, in the early morning of December 11, in 
what appeared to be a coordinated attack, Berkut police forces surrounded 
the Maidan where some 15,000 protestors had gathered and attempted to 
destroy the makeshift barricades scattered about the Maidan; protestors and 
police clashed violently. 
The acts of violence inflicted upon protestors garnered international 
outrage, particularly among US representatives. Secretary of State John 
Kerry condemned the events, stating, “The United States expresses its 
disgust with the decision of Ukrainian authorities to meet the peaceful 
protest in Kyiv's Maidan Square with riot police, bulldozers, and batons, 
rather than with respect for democratic rights and dignity. This response is 
neither acceptable nor does it befit a democracy...” (US Department Of State 
2013b). Though US officials were quick to extend their support for the 
protestors, the United States, particularly in terms of foreign policy, had been 
largely uninvolved in Eastern Europe for some time. The gesture, limited 
strictly to words of encouragement for the protestors, highlighted the Obama 
administration’s tendency to prioritize issues of international concern, an 
administration much more hesitant to engage in conflicts that did not directly 
affect the nation, unlike its predecessor.  
 Despite the United States’ verbal encouragement, Moscow outright 
condemned US presence and support in their former republic, calling US 
involvement in Kyiv “the desperate subversion of Ukraine” (Robles 2013), 
while Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned that 
“[United States] interference in domestic processes in Ukraine may have 
very serious consequences” (Interfax-Ukraine 2013a). Russia’s contempt 
was historically consistent with its fear of western encroachment into former 
Soviet satellite states or republics. With thousands of protestors in Kyiv 
emboldened by US encouragement and upset with the increasingly corrupt 
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and pro-Russian Yanukovych, Ukraine, one of Russia’s last strongholds in 
keeping the West at bay, seemed to be slipping away. 
On January 16, 2014, Ukraine’s parliament passed sweeping anti-
protest legislation that were, in many ways, as outrageous as the process by 
which they were approved: a show of hands (BBC News 2014d). The United 
States was quick to condemn the laws, expressing concern over their 
shockingly undemocratic nature. US Department of State Spokesperson Jen 
Psaki issued a statement regarding the passage of this legislation, noting that 
the measures were pushed through “without adhering to proper procedures” 
and that “the substance of the Rada’s actions…cast serious doubt on 
Ukraine’s commitment to democratic norms” (US Department Of State 
2014a). Additionally, Secretary of State John Kerry described the laws as 
"anti-democratic," "wrong," and "extremely disturbing" (US Department Of 
State 2014b). 
The passage of the January 16 anti-protest laws pushed protests in a 
much more violent direction. Ukraine’s Euromaidan rapidly descended into 
chaos deliberately orchestrated by far right, radical, and arguably fascist 
groups. The notable state-funded Russia Today (RT) published numerous 
stories describing the events unraveling in Kyiv as peaceful protests 
“usurped by masked rioters with guns” (Russia Today 2014a) and “an 
attempt at a coup by radicalized protestors” (Russia Today 2014c). The 
Russian media’s continued and unwavering labeling of these radical 
protestors in Kyiv as fascists, anti-Semites, and neo-Nazis sparked fueled a 
passive-aggressive journalistic debate between Russian and western media 
outlets who insisted that “Euromaidan officials are not fascists, nor do 
fascists dominate the movement” (BBC News 2014e) and preferred to label 
Right Sector as a “right-wing coalition” with “unstinting nationalism” 
(Kramer 2014). Russia, however, did not buy into this narrative, and 
condemned the violent protestors attempting to seize control of government 
buildings in Kyiv.  
In a series of phone conversations with President Yanukovych on 
January 23, 27, and 28, United States Vice President Joe Biden repeatedly 
urged Yanukovych to call for an immediate de-escalation of the violent 
standoff between protestors and police, and urged him to repeal the “anti-
democratic laws” passed by Ukraine’s Rada earlier that month (The White 
House 2014f, 2014g, 2014h). During an emergency session of the Rada on 
January 28, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov tendered a sudden 
resignation and the dominant Party of Regions compromised with opposition 
leaders to all out repeal, or at least lessen the intensity of, the anti-protest 
laws passed less than two weeks prior.  
In an attempt to address the clear, immediate economic needs of 
Ukraine, officials from the US and EU began talks of assembling an aid 
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package for the restless country, what The Wall Street Journal called the US 
and EU’s way of “stepping up efforts to sway the outcome of the political 
crisis in Ukraine” (Norman, Entous, and Cullison 2014). Indeed, both the 
United States and key members of the EU hoped that stimulating Ukraine’s 
economy would aid in the country eventually implementing a new, more pro-
Western government. Although the bid only hinted at US efforts to influence 
the political environment of Ukraine, an intercepted and subsequently leaked 
telephone conversation between two top US officials that emerged in early 
February all but cemented speculation about direct US involvement in 
Ukraine, rather than encouragement.  
In a “private” conversation between US Assistant Secretary of State 
Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt the two 
discussed how to alleviate the political and economic crisis in Ukraine by 
seemingly installing opposition members as leaders in a new government. 
The conversation between Nuland and Pyatt laid bare “a deep degree of US 
involvement in affairs that Washington officially says are Ukraine’s to 
resolve” (Gearan 2014) and Russia, predictably, condemned the US for what 
Moscow called a “clear breach” (Macdonald 2014) of the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum on Security Assurances which assured the United States 
would respect Ukraine’s independent sovereignty.  
Meanwhile, tensions in Kyiv continued to mount. Maidan protestors 
marched on Ukraine’s parliament on February 18 where they were fired 
upon by Berkut forces using live and rubber ammunition, prompting US 
Vice President Biden to call Yanukovych and express his “grave concern 
regarding the crisis on the streets of Kyiv” (The White House 2014i). On 
February 21, Yanukovych and notable opposition leaders Vitali Klitschko, 
Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Oleh Tyahnybok agreed to a deal that would 
hopefully end the crisis gripping the country. Despite the success of any 
compromise at all, opposition leaders speaking at the Maidan faced boos and 
jeers by protestors who remained dissatisfied that the proposed deal kept 
Yanukovych in power (BBC News 2014c). In the face of the first sign of 
negotiation in months, a Right Sector activist took the staged and threatened 
to begin armed attacks on the government if the President did not tender an 
immediate resignation (Higgins and Kramer 2014).  
Reports soon began circulating that Yanukovych had fled Kyiv for 
the predominantly ethnic-Russian city of Kharkiv in the east. Less than 24 
hours after Yanukovych fled Kyiv, the Rada, backed by 328 of its 447 
members, voted to remove him from his presidential office, citing his guilt in 
various human rights violations and the desertion of his duties as Ukraine’s 
president (Al Jazeera 2014; Booth 2014). In his place, parliament voted to 
elect their speaker, Oleksander Turchynov as interim president to serve until 
the early elections on May 25; opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk was 
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voted in as Ukraine’s new Prime Minister, replacing Serhiy Arbuzov who 
took over as interim PM following Mykola Azarov’s sudden resignation. 
Although the United States did not overtly endorse the ouster of 
Yanukovych, Washington stated that it would work with its allies, including 
Russia, to support Ukraine in its efforts going forward as they pursued a path 
to democracy. Moscow, however, condemned Ukrainian protestors, 
opposition leaders, and the United States in one fell swoop. Prime Minister 
and former president Dmitry Medvedev criticized the legitimacy of 
Ukraine’s interim government and warned that Moscow may not cooperate 
with or even recognize the government that emerged out of the more violent 
participants of the Euromaidan revolution. 
 The unexpected finale to Ukraine’s months-long revolution raised 
questions about the constitutionality of impeaching Yanukovych who had 
recently been granted sanctuary in Russia. The runaway president had not 
tendered an official resignation, he had not been found unfit to due to illness, 
nor had he died. The hasty actions taken by the Rada on February 22 were 
somewhat murky in their constitutionality (Sindelar 2014), particularly 
because the Rada did not follow protocol as outlined in Ukraine’s 
constitution regarding proper impeachment procedure.  
 In what appeared to be a direct response to the events in Kyiv, in the 
early hours of February 27, dozens of armed, masked men stormed 
government buildings in Crimea’s administrative hub, Simferopol, 
barricaded themselves inside and effectively took control of the city. Though 
the gunmen were initially unidentifiable in their unmarked uniforms, the 
“little green men” patrolling the streets of Simferopol spoke Russian, carried 
guns issued by the Russian army, drove trucks with Russian plates, and 
perhaps, in the most telling display, raised the Russian flag over the 
parliamentary building once they seized control (Shevchenko 2014). 
Immediately, officials in Kyiv expressed outrage, calling the events “an 
armed invasion and occupation in violation of all international agreements 
and norms” (Reuters 2014); the recently disposed Yanukovych, however, 
called the occupation of Crimea “an absolutely natural reaction to the bandit 
coup that has occurred in Kyiv” (Ostroukh 2014; Walker 2014b). Any sense 
of moral high ground that Russia had in regards to the so-called hostile 
takeover of Kyiv by radicals completely collapsed following their armed 
invasion of Crimea. 
President Barack Obama issued a statement on February 28 that 
warned Russia of the potential costs of intervening in Ukraine and noted that 
Russian military action in Crimea would be a “clear violation of Russia’s 
commitment to respect the independence and sovereignty and borders of 
Ukraine, and of international laws” that would be “deeply destabilizing” and 
against the best interests of Ukraine, Russia, and Europe (The White House 
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2014m). Putin, however, denied that Russian troops were behind the events 
unfolding in Crimea, claiming it was local self-defense units who took up 
arms against what they felt was an illegitimate government in Kyiv, and that 
any presence of Russian troops was an attempt to control for any radicals 
that may move toward Crimea (Kelley 2014).  
In response to Russia’s audacity to move into Ukraine unauthorized, 
on March 6, President Obama authorized sanctions against individuals 
responsible for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (The 
White House 2014b) and in a phone call with President Putin, emphasized 
that Russia’s actions in Ukraine were not internationally acceptable (The 
White House 2014e). Although the crisis in Crimea defined the relationship 
between Russia and the US, it also shed light on the relationship between the 
US and Ukraine that was largely defined by strategic maneuvers to 
counterbalance major powers in the region. The inaction of the United States 
in the face of the events in Crimea, a clear violation of the Memorandum, 
spoke volumes about the United States’ bond with Ukraine. In the days and 
months that followed, it appeared that the only action the US was willing to 
take was a bit of diplomatic finger-wagging. 
On March 12, President Obama and Ukraine’s Prime Minister 
Arseniy Yatsenyuk held a bilateral meeting to discuss the ongoing events in 
Ukraine, particularly the threat posed by Crimea’s occupation. The meeting 
came just days before what President Obama called a “slapdash” referendum 
“patched together” in Crimea in which the autonomous region would vote to 
secede from Ukraine - a referendum, the President added, that the United 
States would “completely reject” (The White House 2014l). The referendum 
results claimed that votes in favor of Crimea seceding from Ukraine reached 
96.77 percent (Morello, Englund, and Witte 2014), but a report accidentally 
released by a Russian government website in May 2014 revealed that the 
referendum had garnered a maximum 30 percent turnout with only half of 
this percentage voting in favor of annexation from Ukraine (Gregory 2014). 
Before the international community had ample time to react to the sham of a 
referendum, Putin had already signed an executive order recognizing the 
status of the Republic of Crimea as an independent state at 10:30pm on 
March 17, and at 1:00pm Moscow time the following day, signed an 
executive order absorbing Crimea into the Russian Federation (Putin 2014a, 
2014b). In response, the United States upped the ante on sanctions put in 
place on March 6, placing additional sanctions on Russian officials and 
individuals in the Russian arms sector. By March 20, Obama had imposed 
another set of sanctions which included Russian energy companies and banks 
in the hopes that Russia would de-escalate its looming presence in the east 
(The White House 2014a).  
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While the world focused on the crisis unraveling in Crimea, several 
oblasts in Ukraine’s Donbas region were dealing with turmoil of their own. 
In the weeks following the conclusion of the Maidan, pro-Russian forces 
took to the streets of Donetsk and Luhansk to express dissatisfaction with 
and distrust of the new government in Kyiv. Pro-Russian demonstrators took 
control of buildings, burned Ukrainian-language books and posters of the 
regionally despised nationalist Right Sector movement, and replaced 
publicly flown Ukrainian flags with Russian flags (Kushch 2014). Tensions 
between supporters of the government in Kyiv and supporters of greater 
Russian presence in the country continued to escalate, made worse by so-
called “protest-tourists” flowing in from Russia, suggesting that the protests 
were at least at some degree coordinated by Moscow (Roth 2014).  
By late March, Russian forces amassing along the Russian-Ukrainian 
border grew to nearly 40,000 troops according to some reports by US 
intelligence officials (Stewart and Hosenball 2014). The Donbas region 
seemed to be descending into madness, with pro-Russian separatists 
declaring the Donetsk Oblast to be the People’s Republic of Donetsk on 
April 6 and a similar declaration of the Luhansk People’s Republic on April 
27, highlighting the deep divisions at the heart of the conflict in the Donbas. 
To make matters worse, on May 11, 2014, Donetsk and Luhansk declared 
independence from Ukraine in another round of highly unrecognized 
referendums in their quest to join Russia (Walker and Grytsenko 2014). 
 
US-Ukraine Relations 2014-Present: Petro Poroshenko and Barack 
Obama 
As the Donbas effectively devolved into open revolt, Kyiv was 
preparing to elect a new president in the early elections scheduled for May 
25. Among the candidates running were Right Sector’s Dmytro Yarosh, 
Fatherland’s Yulia Tymoshenko, Svoboda’s Oleh Tyahnybok, and UDAR-
backed chocolate mogul Petro Poroshenko. Poroshenko’s promises to fight 
the debilitating corruption limiting Ukraine’s growth as a democratic nation 
and his condemnation of the separatists in the east in part led to his victory in 
which he garnered over 55 percent of the popular vote (BBC News 2014a). 
During a meeting with Poroshenko in Warsaw, Poland, on June 4, Obama 
formally extended his support for the election outcome and noted that he had 
been “deeply impressed by [Poroshenko’s] vision” for a Ukraine free of 
corruption and filled with democratic opportunities for all of its citizens (The 
White House 2014k). Additionally, Obama pledged to provide additional 
assistance to the Ukraine to support its military, bringing total US assistance 
to Ukraine in 2014 to $184 million, not including the $1 billion loan 
agreement signed in April (The White House 2014c). Perhaps this was the 
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United States’ way of compensating Ukraine financially in light of its 
inaction regarding Crimea.  
Following his inauguration, Poroshenko sat down with EU 
representatives in Brussels on June 27 to sign the long awaited Association 
Agreement whose reversal had sparked months of unrest and violence in 
Ukraine. In a demonstration of just how violent the conflict in the east had 
grown, the war took a sobering turn on July 17 when pro-Russian rebels shot 
down passenger jet Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, killing all 298 civilians 
onboard. The Boeing 777 was shot down by a Buk-surface-to-air missile 
fired from territory controlled by separatists in Donetsk and reports surfaced 
that Russians had been operating a similar missile launcher in the area just 
hours prior to the downing of the flight (Sweeney 2014).  
In early September 2014, Ukrainian government officials met with 
separatists leaders in Minsk, Belarus to discuss a peace plan and ceasefire. 
Poroshenko visited Washington later that same month to plead with 
Congress about granting Ukraine’s military more lethal and non-lethal 
assistance. During a joint session of Congress held on September 14, 2014, 
Poroshenko noted that non-lethal equipment and supplies such as night 
vision goggles and blankets were crucial to Ukraine’s soldiers, “but one 
cannot win the war with blankets” (Poroshenko 2014). Although the United 
States agreed to assist Ukraine with an additional $53 million (The White 
House 2014d), the flow of non-lethal support to Ukraine revealed the United 
States’ alignment with Ukraine and subsequently its hesitation to challenge 
Moscow by arming Ukraine with lethal equipment. 
Despite hopes that the Minsk agreement would hold, hostilities 
between rebels and Ukrainian forces continued to mount through October, 
with accusations from each side that the other had violated the fragile 
ceasefire. Additionally, the election of pro-Western parties and officials 
during Ukraine’s parliamentary elections on October 26 garnered high praise 
from Washington, but districts in the Donbas, largely excluded from voting, 
held presidential and parliamentary elections of their own on November 2. 
Tensions thickened when NATO officials confirmed reports on November 
12 that a concerning number of Russian tanks, artillery, and troops had 
poured into eastern Ukraine over several days in what appeared to be 
preparations to reengage in the military conflict gripping the region 
(Herszenhorn 2014). By December, tensions in eastern Ukraine remained 
dangerously high. In fact, Ukraine appeared to be desperately clinging to the 
ceasefire which had failed weeks, if not months prior; the ceasefire agreed to 
in Minsk was effectively fictional.  
In another blow to Russia’s economy, suffering under the economic 
sanctions imposed by the US and EU, Obama signed into law the Ukraine 
Freedom Support Act of 2014 on December 18, which authorized the 
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President to “provide Ukraine with defense articles, services, and training in 
order to counter offensive weapons” [emphasis added] (Gerlach 2014). 
January 2015 was largely defined by increased hostilities and violent battles 
between separatists and Ukrainian armed forces trying to take or hold 
specific territories. By the end of the month, separatists leaders in the Donbas 
pledged that the separatists would make no effort to talk about the ceasefire 
and the Minsk agreement completely dissolved (Lyman and Kramer 2015). 
The collapse of the Minsk agreement raised alarms throughout Washington 
and western Europe, but on February 12, the fears raised by the failed 
ceasefire quelled as Ukrainian, Russian, German, and French leaders 
convened in Belarus for another long round of talks that resulted in a 
renewed ceasefire effective on February 15, the so-called Minsk II.  
As the eyes of the world remained fixed on Ukraine, desperate for the 
renewed ceasefire to hold, in mid-March US soldiers in Germany began a 
long convoy through six NATO member countries to demonstrate US 
presence and strength in a region of the world Russia apparently sought to 
bring back under its sphere of influence. Additionally, the US sent 300 Army 
paratroopers to Ukraine to help train the country’s forces fighting in the east. 
Although Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed US troops were training 
Ukrainian forces inside the combat zone, the activity of US troops was 
limited to the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv, 
one of Ukraine’s westernmost cities near the border with Poland (Reuters 
2015a). In response to Russia’s accusations, the Pentagon called the 
allegations a “ridiculous attempt to shift the focus away from what is actually 
happening in eastern Ukraine” and, by extension, Russia’s own involvement 
(Baczynska and Alexander 2015). Relations between the US and Ukraine 
from June to July remained amicable, with the US extending military 
training efforts to members of Ukraine’s regular army, a program that 
brought total US security assistance to Ukraine since 2014 to over $244 
million (Reuters 2015c; Siddons 2015).  
As US forces continued to train members of Ukraine’s outdated and 
underfunded military, by July, a growing number of far-right supporters in 
Kyiv became increasingly vocal in their demands for a declaration of war 
against the rebels in the east. The seemingly fictitious ceasefire had managed 
to survive nearly five harrowing months of subversive attempts to undermine 
it, but ultra-nationalists groups like Right Sector called for an immediate 
dissolution of the ceasefire and an end to all diplomatic relations with Russia 
who was persistently backing the separatists in the Donbas (Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty 2015b).  
Characteristic of its predictably unpredictable nature, in early 
September an entire week passed without a single Ukrainian casualty 
reported in the east. As events in Ukraine continue to hurdle toward the 
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present day, the ongoing relationship between the US and Ukraine raises 
questions about the future of Ukraine. Inaction on behalf of the US in regards 
to the crisis in Crimea and its continued supply of non-lethal weapons to 
modernize Ukraine’s military spoke volumes about US hesitation to 
challenge the largest power in the region, Russia. However, recent 
developments in Washington may redefine the relationship between the two 
countries. On November 10, 2015, Congress passed the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 that revived the ongoing discussion 
about providing lethal arms to Ukraine. Of the $607 billion budgeted, the bill 
allocated $300 million to assist Ukraine in its fight against Russia and the 
Russian-backed separatists in the east; of that $300 million, Congress 
designated $50 million to provide Ukraine with lethal assistance such as anti-
armor weapon systems, mortars, grenade launchers, small arms and 
ammunition (Johnson 2015). According to reports from the White House, 
President Obama – despite months of careful diplomatic maneuvering to 
prevent arming Ukraine and subsequently infuriating Russia – is likely to 
sign the legislation when it reaches his desk (Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty 2015a).  
 
Conclusion 
This research reveals how the relationship between the US and 
Ukraine has changed over time, and provides suggestions for what to look 
for in the future. United States foreign policy towards Ukraine has always 
reflected US national interest, and has often mirrored America’s changing 
relationship with Russia. In the early Post-USSR days, there was hope 
around the world for an end to the possibility of a thermonuclear war, and for 
the normalization of relations between the United States and Russia along 
with the other former Soviet Republics. Back then, the focus of the United 
States and Ukraine went from democracy building to nuclear disarmament 
under Kravchuk, Kuchma, George H.W. Bush and Clinton. Thus, in the early 
1990s, relations between the US and Ukraine, like those between the US and 
Russia, were fairly good. It was in the US national interest for the former 
Soviet republics to become democracies and form positive relations with the 
US from both a security and economic standpoint. Once Ukraine signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994, the US and Ukraine could turn to 
other issues, such as the pursuit of NATO and EU membership.  Ukraine was 
of geopolitical importance to the US, not only from the standpoint of its 
geographic location between Russia to the East and the EU to the West, but 
also by curbing Russia’s imperial ambitions within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Because of Ukraine’s geopolitical importance, it 
became the third largest recipient of US aid and the most active CIS state 
within NATO’s Partnership for Peace in the 1990’s.   
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However, the ascension of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister or 
President from 1999 to the present complicated Ukraine’s plans to “go west.” 
Putin’s stance toward Ukraine has always been clear: it has been –and will 
remain- under the Russian sphere of influence whether it wants to or not. In 
addition, corruption scandals, in particular the discovery of Ukraine’s sale of 
military equipment to Iraq during the Kuchma regime would lead to a 
distancing between both nations.  
By the end of 2004, the Orange Revolution led to a geopolitical 
reorientation of Ukraine toward the West’s open arms. The United States 
was pleased with Ukraine’s popular democratic movement, leading to a 
newfound period of goodwill. Nevertheless, infighting between the principal 
actors in the Orange Revolution would soon reveal their ineptitude in solving 
Ukraine’s multitude of problems and corruption scandals of their own 
emerged. Widespread disillusionment led Ukraine back to an Eastern 
orientation under Yanukovych. The relatively new Obama Administration 
took a pragmatic approach toward Yanukovych, though as was the case in 
the previous administration, attention was far more focused on developments 
in the Middle East.  That is, until Yanukovych reneged on his pledge to sign 
the EU Association Agreement in November 2013.  
The violent protests and government crackdowns forced a renewed 
attention from the United States toward Ukraine, in a vain effort to come to a 
peaceful solution. Yanukovych’s self-exile would be followed by Russia’s 
eventual violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity by forcefully seizing 
Crimea and supporting Russian or pro-Russian forces violently occupying 
the Donbas regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Despite the fact that such 
brazen action has violated the Budapest Memorandum, the United States 
stood by haplessly as Ukrainian territory was seized, and the toll of death in 
the conflict has risen to over 8,000 as of fall 2015. This has led many to 
question if a Cold War redub is upon us.  
There does not appear to be any end to the conflict in sight, at least 
one that leaves Ukraine territorially intact. The likelihood of Crimea 
returning to Ukraine is dismal, if not completely unthinkable at this point. 
Infighting and disagreements continue to plague Ukraine’s politics and the 
politicians, such as Petro Poroshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, initially 
thought to be the guiding hope after Yanukovych’s ouster, appear to be 
losing steam among the population. Today, the saga continues with the 
United States poised to pledge more economic resources than ever to reorient 
Ukraine to the West under Petro Poroshenko’s watch.  
Realism in international relations has four main tenets: The most 
important actors in global politics are states; international bodies do not have 
the authority to force states to act (or not to act); states are rational actors that 
always act in their own self-interest; and finally, the most important 
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responsibility of the state is its self-preservation. Next, we apply these 
foundations of realism to US-Ukraine relations. 
As summarized in this section, the most important actors have clearly 
been states: The United States, Ukraine, and Russia. It is not possible to 
discuss US-Ukrainian relations without taking into account US-Russian 
relations and Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Even the “officially” non-state 
actors that are occupying the Donbas are clearly taking their cues from 
Moscow, and are therefore agents of a state- the Russian state.  
As for the role of international bodies, the European Union, NATO, 
and the United Nations Security Council, all express their opinions on events 
transpiring in Ukraine, mostly by condemning Russian actions and activities, 
yet none of these organizations can --nor want-- to try to resolve Ukraine’s 
territorial dispute with Russia.  
It is absolutely clear that the United States has always acted in its 
own self-interest in its interactions with Ukraine. From democratization, to 
nuclear non-proliferation, to support of the Orange Revolution, to not 
intervening militarily in the Russian annexation of Crimea, all of the US 
actions have been that of a rational actor. Likewise, Ukraine has acted in its 
own self-interest vis-à-vis its posture toward the US. Upon independence, 
Ukraine was in a deeply fragile state. With a floundering economy and the 
transition from Communism to capitalism, it had to turn to the United States 
for assistance. Although Ukraine would be in a stronger position today if it 
had retained some of its nuclear arsenal, at the time, it pragmatically decided 
to sign the NPT and rid itself of nuclear warheads by 1996. Ukraine even 
sent troops to Iraq to appease the US, despite the fact that most Ukrainians 
were against it. Many elements of Ukrainian society, particularly the younger 
generation of people that had little or no memory of living in the Soviet 
Union, pressed their leaders to look West with their activities in the Orange 
Revolution, and after gaining office, the leadership did so. 
Finally, in terms of self-preservation, that is the most important focus 
for Ukraine, which has seen its territorial integrity violated by its Russian 
neighbors, and has lost thousands of people in its fight to regain control over 
the Donbas. The United States, for its part, is also seeking self-preservation 
by not engaging in a military conflict with Russia over Ukrainian territory. 
Ukraine is frankly not sufficiently in the US national interest to go to war 
over, particularly considering the conflicts that still rage in the Middle East, 
the threat of international terrorism and the necessity of collaborating with 
Russia in a military campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS).  
 In sum, the four criteria of realism are not only met, but exceeded in 
the case of US-Ukraine Relations. The future of Ukraine hangs in the 
balance of the west’s welcoming, open arms and Russia’s greedy, grasping 
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hands. At the moment, nothing is certain. But the fact that this is a textbook 
case in realism leads us to conclude that the states of Ukraine and the US 
(and Russia) will continue to act in a rational self-interested manner, for their 
own self-preservation, without regard to the expressions of international 
organizations. Thus, we can expect the United States to provide the proposed 
funding for military aid and continued training of the Ukrainian military. It is 
simply too much of a risk to abandon or isolate Ukraine, as it would then be 
more likely to be forced to turn to Russia. We can expect the Ukrainian 
government to continue to work with the state of Russia to bring an end to 
the fighting in the Donbas, in exchange for expanded autonomous rights 
under a more federalist system in order to preserve what is left of its 
territorial integrity. Ukraine currently does not have the military might to 
remove the pro-Russian forces in the Donbas. And we can expect Russia to 
never cede Crimea. Since the US is not willing to go to war over Ukraine, 
and Russia knows that it may go to war if it invades the territory of a NATO 
member state, the current frontlines are likely to hold. Given the recently 
forged alliance between the US and Russia on a Syrian military campaign 
against ISIS, it is entirely possible, if not probable, that as Russia focuses its 
military attention toward the Middle East, that it will not choose to sustain 
(or be able to sustain) the forces in the Donbas and find a negotiated 
settlement. Ultimately, however, it is Russia who seemingly is in the best 
position to determine the outcome of what will happen to Ukraine. 
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